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ABSTRACT. This paper considers the role of the Arctic Council (AC) and its relationship to the future or even futures.
Factors such as sea ice thinning and melting permafrost, alongside globalisation, have been cited as consequential in
transforming the Arctic region. While we might be cautious about the novelty of change per se, there is a need
for further debate about how the ‘future’ is imagined and put into practice. Exploring different logics, including
precaution, pre-emption and preparedness, consideration is offered on how the AC attempts to anticipate the future.
The contentious role of observers is investigated by way of an example, and it is concluded that there is more work to
be done in terms of how different futures are assembled, mobilised and put into practice.
Introduction
The Arctic is undergoing significant change. In the years
to come, these changes will present Arctic stakeholders
with a line of new challenges, as well as opportunities, as
the region gradually begins to open up as a result of cli-
mate change. How will this trend affect the peoples living
in the Arctic? How will it affect the fragile biodiversity of
the region? And how will the Arctic states and its peoples
address the challenges and opportunities of tomorrow in
the Arctic? (Nuuk Declaration 2011).
As the ice withdraws, technological advances are
creating opportunities to open transport routes across
the Arctic Ocean and exploit the natural resources of
the Arctic. These developments must be managed in a
responsible and sustainable manner so that they benefit
the region and do not lead to undesired side effects. The
Arctic Council (AC) should display the shared future
vision of the Arctic states so as to consolidate the good
co-operation in the region. Its work should be guided by
openness and flexibility to enable it to address topical
issues (Sweden 2011).
Debates over Arctic governance, and specifically the
inter-governmental forum the AC, are underpinned by
an explicit sense that the geographical transformation
of the Arctic region is a driving force (for example,
Nuttall 2008, Crate and Nuttall 2009, Stephenson, Smith
and Agnew 2011, Young 2012). A special issue in the
Swedish journal Ambio on ‘tipping points’ which brought
together social and physical scientists discusses, with
great conviction and vigour, the un-settling prospect that
the Arctic region is facing ‘turbulent times’ (for example
Nuttall 2012; Wassman and Lenton 2012; Young 2012).
In their sourcing and sighting of ‘tipping points’, the
aforementioned authors coalesce around the following
objects, spaces and processes; thinning and disappearing
sea ice, ice sheets, melting permafrost, boreal forests
and circumpolar climate change (Wassman and Lenton
2012). Making matters worse economic globalisation, for
others, is also implicated in this unsettling of the Arctic
(Anderson 2009; Ebinger and Zambetakis 2009; Smith
2010). As Oran Young recently asserted, ‘It is beyond
doubt that the Arctic is in the midst of a transformation,
driven by the combined forces of climate change and
globalization and expected to lead to increased human
activities in the region in such forms as oil and gas
development, commercial shipping, industrial fishing and
ship based tourism’ (Young 2011: 327, emphasis added).
The word ‘expected’ here is probably the key one
because it leads onto a discussion about how various
actors and institutions might prepare for a changed and
changing Arctic (on the futures, see Wallman 2002).
For Young at least, the AC needs to play its part in
contributing to the development of an Arctic regime
complex so that it can face ‘the foreseeable future’, and
he proposes a series of modest reforms such as promot-
ing ecosystem-based management and strengthening the
financial footing of the organisation itself (Young 2012).
Reforming, however, is one thing. The role of preparation
and anticipation with reference to how various actors
are positioning themselves, in the midst of this profound
transformation, is another matter. While we might hope
that the AC is well placed to create, circulate and nurture
particular Arctic futures, they might neither be shared nor
respected. The Arctic Climate Change Impact Assess-
ment (ACIA 2005), for instance, provides an interesting
case study of how a particular future was imagined,
modeled and represented but it ultimately ended up being
just that, an assessment rather than a strategy because
there was insufficient agreement over contemporary and
future facing representations of the Arctic.
While there is clearly a reformist agenda regarding
the AC as a decision-making organisation, my sense is
that we need to step backwards and think more fully
about how the ‘future’ is conceptualised and mobilised in
these discussions (Anderson 2010, Anderson and Adey
2011). It is not simply a matter of, on the one hand, dis-
entangling co-operative and conflict-based trends within
the Arctic itself, and on the other hand, hoping for a more
cooperative vision to prevail with the AC as centrepiece.
We need to be mindful of how the ‘for-seeable future’
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is also put to work discursively and materially. It is a
powerful resource to shape debate, influence practice and
capable of generating emotions such as fear, hope and/or
anger (Crate and Nuttall 2009; Moisi 2009; Nuttall 2012).
Take the example of the May 2008 Ilulissat Declaration.
Guided by appeals to the Law of the Sea but not be it
noted to the United Nations Law of the Sea Convention
because of the non-accession of the United States, it
outlined a shared vision, ‘The Arctic Ocean stands at the
threshold of significant changes. Climate change and the
melting of ice have a potential impact on vulnerable eco-
systems, the livelihoods of local inhabitants and indigen-
ous communities, and the potential exploitation of natural
resources. By virtue of their sovereignty, sovereign rights
and jurisdiction in large areas of the Arctic Ocean the five
coastal states are in a unique position to address these
possibilities and challenges’ (Denmark 2008).
The declaration as a concrete object serves as a
courier for the rhetoric that it contains. The claim, for
example, that ‘The Arctic stands at a threshold’ performs
a great deal of rhetorical work. In just three sentences,
for example, we have the Arctic 5 parties (Canada,
Denmark/Greenland, Norway, Russia and the United
States) set up a predicament, enroll ‘scientific facts’, and
then invoke the legal as an opportunity for redress in
the present, and the future. Their ‘unique position’ is
taken for granted and privileged as a de facto model of
governance (a point of contention to the other ‘Arctic
states’ – Finland, Iceland and Sweden who together
make up the A8). Broader questions relating to climate
change and fossil fuel exploitation in and beyond the
Arctic region are put to one side in order to invoke a
future in which what is fore-grounded is the need to de-
velop procedures for orderly conduct and development –
and thus convey a hopeful vision of the future rather
than something to be feared or dreaded. With further
rhetorical flourishes directed towards both geographical
proximity and state-sanctioned capacities (whether legal
and or infrastructural) to intervene where appropriate in
the Arctic Ocean, it is hoped that a ‘shared future vision’
will emerge and be securable (see also Sweden 2011).
Taking ‘Arctic futures’ seriously means addressing
inter alia the role of anticipation and the way in which
liberal-democratic states (and other actors including in-
digenous organisations) prepare and pre-empt uncertain-
ties, and even threats to life in general (Anderson 2010;
Anderson and Adey 2011; Nuttall 2012; Smith 2012).
Acting in advance of the future is an integral part of
liberal-democratic life whether it is in the fields of climate
change, terrorism and/or trans-national epidemics. The
idea of the ‘future’ itself deserves reflection. How is ‘the
future’ in the context of the Arctic region known and
rendered actionable? What consequences follow from
acting in the present on the basis of the future and
who is included in that future? With reference to the
AC, I consider the contentious role of observers as
indicative of how ‘Arctic futures’ are not necessarily
shared ones. In that sense there may be futures we
desire, we hope for, we wish to avoid and/or attempt to
prevent.
This last point is important because my concern is
that the kind of ‘shared future vision’ that the Swedish
chairmanship programme for the AC 2011–2013 articu-
lates is one that makes us think about how the Arctic, as
a complex geographical space, is conjured up (Sweden
2011). As the geographer Doreen Massey has noted,
our views of places and spaces can be considered both
as bounded spaces (which might then encourage fears
about outside influences and actors) and be seen to be
shaped by processes and relations that make and re-make
those very places (Massey 1995). Depending on how one
conceptualises the Arctic as a place then some actors,
processes, organisations and social relations might be
more welcome than others, and it is not clear how the
AC will assemble a ‘shared future vision’, given that
emphasis is placed (at least evidenced from the Swedish
2011 statement) on the interests of ‘Arctic states’ while
some pages later it is suggested the view of indigenous
peoples will be ‘listened’ to. Building a ‘shared future
vision’ will also, as the Swedish statement implies, de-
pend on whether the parties concerned can agree on ‘a
shared perception of the situation in the Arctic region’.
This may prove troublesome given that, on the one hand,
the ACIA suggested that the Arctic Ocean could be
seasonally ice-free by the end of the 21st century, and the
Arctic Monitoring and Assessment Programme (AMAP)
concluded that somewhere between 2030–2040 was more
likely (ACIA 2005, AMAP in the form of SWIPA 2011).
A gap of some decades in these two assessments poses
its own particular challenges in terms of building a
‘shared future vision’. On the other hand, the SWIPA
(Snow, Ice, Permafrost in the Arctic) report, moreover,
concludes that the period between 2005–2010 featured
record warming in the Arctic and that, ‘the observed
changes in sea ice on the Arctic Ocean and in the mass of
the Greenland Ice Sheet and Arctic ice caps and glaciers
over the last 10 years are dramatic and represent an
obvious departure from the long-term patterns’ (SWIPA
2011 in preface). The report concluded that governments
in particular might well need to respond more quickly
to these changes, and prepare for an acceleration of
warming with corresponding consequences for sea ice
and permafrost.
Before turning to how we might conceptualise the
future (or perhaps futures plural), I address my under-
standing of the AC because this organisation has often
been imagined to be indicative of a more hopeful Arctic
future; one based on interested state parties engaged in
co-operation and co-ordination and explicit recognition
of permanent participants as members of the AC. As an
organisation it seeks to be a spokesperson for the Arctic,
and specifically the Arctic region. While it strives to
represent the Arctic, the Arctic also shapes it as well.
As the 2011 Nuuk Declaration, asserted under the title of
‘Strengthening the Arctic Council’ that, ‘Decide that the
Arctic Council should continue to work towards solutions
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to address emerging challenges in the Arctic utilizing
a wide range of challenges’ (Nuuk Declaration 2011).
The reference to ‘emerging’ alongside ‘challenges in the
Arctic’ in this context is crucial, suggesting as it does,
uncertain futures but also a need to anticipate and act in
the here and now to confront a variety of ‘challenges’
residing in the Arctic region, as the future itself is
imagined, deterred, regularised and/or hoped for. As the
Nuuk Declaration outlines at the start of the document,
both human and non-human elements of the Arctic face
‘rapidly changing circumstances’, which will necessitate,
so it is believed and indeed hoped for, an institutionally
strengthened Arctic Council in the future (Nuuk 2011).
But what if the AC does not want to face particular
kinds of futures and what if the Arctic region cannot
be managed in the way that the AC might wish for? I
conclude with a brief consideration of the knotty issue of
observers to the AC, and use the European Union, as an
example to illustrate that there may be also some futures
that are simply dismissed because they are considered
undesirable.
The Arctic Council as a future-facing organisation?
The AC’s creation and evolution as an actor in Arctic
affairs has been debated widely, with a series of com-
mentators reflecting on its potential to be transformed
from a soft law consultative body to something akin to an
organisation with distinct legal competencies (for useful
reviews, Young 2009; Koivurova 2011). This burgeoning
interest in the AC is understandable not least because
organisations are fundamental in shaping Arctic geopolit-
ics (for example, Byers 2009; Dodds 2011). The AC and
other organisations with regional Arctic interests include
NATO, Inuit Circumpolar Council, the Nordic Council
and or Barents Euro-Arctic Council. They are sites of,
and for, geopolitical strategies, regional co-operation,
environmental protection, military activity, and help to
shape public opinion over current assessments and future
trajectories. Organisations, including the AC, should,
quite appropriately, be central to our accounts and in-
terests in the current and future governance of the Arctic
negotiating as they do relations between sovereign states,
permanent participants/indigenous peoples organisations,
and observers including Britain, China and the European
Union.
Behind the façade of the organisation itself, with
its assemblage of a recently established secretariat in
Norway, and associated working groups and networks,
there is a plethora of humans and things (making up
socio-material networks) that need to be brought together
in order for the organisation to be capable of acting in a
manner judged to be either coordinated and/or effective
(see, for a review, Muller 2011, Depledge 2012). Under-
standing the ‘how’ of an organisation not only enables
evaluations of why particular future visions emerge from
the institutions-as-praxis, but what more than human
resources are deployed and arranged in certain ways in
order to stabilise such visions and that are then used
to lend credence to particular courses of action. The
making of a declaration, for example, would offer a prime
example and lend itself well to further ethnographic ex-
amination by researchers (see, for a comparative analysis,
Neumann 2012).
The most manifest way that the AC brings itself
together is through the existence of ministerial meetings
and Senior Arctic Official (SAO) meetings, with the latter
in particular helping to co-ordinate the organisation’s
business and sense of purpose. The adopted rules of
procedure (1998) stipulate requirements and expectation
on all parties. The co-ordination, production and circu-
lation of reports, including the SAO reports, as well as
others such as the ACIA (2005), while they contribute
to policy and academic-related impact also help to as-
semble and reinforce the AC as network-actor. This does
involve people (SAO), documents (SAR reports), and a
sense of durability regarding the future (on an actor-
network approach to this constellation, see Muller 2011).
Institutional reform is thus linked to ‘the challenges and
opportunities facing the Arctic’ in the future. As a recent
SAO report to ministers noted:
Since that time the rapidly changing circumstances
in the Arctic have increased the challenges and op-
portunities facing the Arctic in both volume and
complexity. The establishment of a Secretariat will
strengthen the capacity of the Arctic Council to
respond to these challenges and opportunities. The
Secretariat will enhance the objectives of the Arctic
Council through the establishment of administrative
capacity and by providing continuity, institutional
memory, operational efficiency, enhanced communic-
ation and outreach, exchange of information with
other relevant international organizations and to sup-
port activities of the Arctic Council (SAO 2011).
Declarations are another public element in the work-
ing of the AC. These are declarative and deliberative
in nature. The 2009 Tromso Declaration is a case in
point as it helps to publicise the working goals of the
Arctic Council in the here and now as well as in the
future. As the Norwegian Foreign Minister, Jonas Gahr
Støre told reporters at the time, ‘As human activity in the
Arctic increases, we need new policies. I am therefore
delighted that the Arctic Council today has agreed to
focus on search and rescue in the Arctic, to recommend
safety standards for maritime transport and oil and gas
production in the Arctic, and to establish a task force to
limit emissions of non CO2 drivers of climate change,
such as black carbon and methane, recognizing their
importance in Arctic climate change’ (Store 2009).
Such a potent declaration represents a powerful dis-
cursive intervention. What follows from the apparently
taken for granted claim ‘As human activity in the Arctic
increases’ is to justify and legitimate further interventions
by the Arctic Council in areas that are at once localised
such as maritime transport and hydrocarbon exploitation
but also globalised in the sense of being tasks that
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have attracted global and intergovernmental interaction.
Liquids and gases, as evoked by the Norwegian foreign
minister, help to constitute an imperative to act and thus
lead to the claim that, ‘we need new policies’.
Organisational agency is something that is assembled,
and potentially, re-assembled in order to appear coherent.
We should not assume, therefore, that the AC simply
exists. It is brought together by a variety of big and
little things including words such as ‘the Arctic Coun-
cil’ and material investment and organisation such as
SAO meetings, ministerial and deputy ministerial annual
gatherings, summits, working groups, drafting reports,
declarations, website/virtual presence, and the like. It
is, like all organisations, precarious and capable of be-
ing weakened as well as strengthened; as reflected in
continuing debates about its status as a soft law inter-
governmental forum. There is nothing inevitable about
the trajectory of the Arctic Council as organisation both
in the present and in the future. It could be weakened and
indeed one might consider more explicitly what would it
take for the organisation as such to fail or simply become
considered inert, restructuring gone wrong for example
(more generally, Agnew 2007, Muller 2011).
The activities of the working groups attached to the
Arctic Council have taken on considerable importance
in debates over Arctic governance because of their ac-
knowledged capacity to project ideas and influence, as
spokespersons for the Arctic (for a related example, see
Depledge 2012). If the AC needs to display flexibility
and adaptability (as suggested by the Arctic Governance
Project 2010 report) then what kinds of big and little
things does it need to bring together in order to demon-
strate those kinds of qualities? This might be, as much
about something termed ‘institutional re-organisation’,
as say simply using words and language that emphasise
innovation, experimentation and relevance in the present
and in the future. Finally, it also depends on securing
sufficient consensus and interest from parties that the AC
is incorporated into discussions and actions pertaining to
the making of the future of the Arctic.
The AC, as a lively and indeed precarious organisa-
tion, is to acknowledge its role as a major producer of
discourse and materials, and its capacity to act as an
affective agent (it seeks to reassure and reaffirm). On the
first point, the AC through press releases, official website,
declarations, reports, and public statements plays a major
role in producing discourse about itself and its role in the
making of Arctic governance. These are quite literally
‘organisational texts’ in the sense of both representing
the organisation and organising representation of the
Arctic region. The 1996 Ottawa Declaration would be
primus inter pares when it comes to acknowledging such
‘organisational texts’ and its role in establishing a high
level forum designed for ‘promoting, co-operation, co-
ordination and interaction among the Arctic states, with
the involvement of the Arctic indigenous communities
and other Arctic inhabitants on common Arctic issues,
in particular issues of sustainable development and envir-
onmental protection in the Arctic’ (Ottawa Declaration
1996).
Developing this high-level inter-governmental forum,
in the aftermath of the 1996 Ottawa Declaration, de-
pended on a series of elements that enabled the AC
to appear as a coherent entity. The most notable of
which were the working groups such as AMAP and the
Protection of the Arctic Marine Environment (PAME).
A plethora of smaller elements, including the agreed
rules of procedure play a vital role in creating the AC
as organisation. As an organisation in a constant state of
becoming, the goal or reference point for the AC remains
multi-faceted including sustainable development, peace
and security co-operation, and the promotion of polar
science. Over the last fifteen years, there have been a
variety of goals/end points referred to in declarations and
statements by the AC membership.
The AC, and its membership in particular, seek to
assemble and appeal to both human and non-human
elements of the Arctic for the purpose of working to-
gether towards a shared future. A rapidly changing Arctic
region, with due reference given to climate change in
particular, is as significant as appeals to indigenous know-
ledge and/or the co-operation between various members
of the AC including permanent participants, states and
observers. The staff that make up the secretariat, the
scientists who serve on working groups and the officials
and ministers who populate AC meetings and summits
help to assemble something that can be termed the AC.
Objects, practices and processes including a medley of
things such as climate change, sea ice thinning, pol-
lutants, and the presence of aircraft and ships play a
role in helping to animate the agency of the AC. The
latter acts, or is seen to act, in response to and even
anticipation of, further sea ice thinning, more ship-based
movement and possible environmental emergencies in
the future, and those kinds of actions are themselves
dependent on a huge amount of work conducted in the
Arctic region and elsewhere in the world including peer-
reviewed work, future mathematical modeling and the
like. We, thus, need to be attentive concerning how and
why such things become enrolled to make claims on how
particular future visions of Arctic governance become
framed and legitimated, but also recognise that objects
and practices can resist such endeavours. As far as we
know the Russian flag placed at the bottom of the central
Arctic Ocean remains in place for example and images of
said flag continue to circulate on the web (Dodds 2011).
As an organisation, the AC contributes to the spatial
ordering and temporal arrangement of the Arctic region.
The establishment of summits, the release of reports
and the updating of websites (including the official AC
website) help to circulate, order and enroll elements into
a socio-material network. The interaction of objects, texts
and people are critical in creating solidarities, claims
and articulations of ‘authority’, especially through the
release of declarations and statements. As a producer and
circulator of ideas and representations, the AC helps to
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spatially order the Arctic region, something that a raft
of scholars have considered more broadly (most notably,
Keskitalo 2004 but also Heininen and Scott 2010). Public
declarations frame the Arctic as a vulnerable and lively
space, as a space of co-operation, and as a space needing
further intervention both in the present and in the future,
especially in the face of search and rescue and oil spills
prevention. The remit of the AC Emergency Preven-
tion, Preparedness and Response Working Group (EPPR)
highlights this explicitly in its strategic plan. Inhabitants
and physical environments especially the Arctic Ocean
itself are weaved and connected together to enable the
AC to act and intervene, and its reports and declarations
help to spread ideas and practices.
Circulation and connection is a critical element in
the work of the AC. ‘Good circulation’ is one in which
those ideas and practices associated with the AC move
freely, and influence networks of governance. The AC
as an agent, with a capacity to act and intervene, also
reminds of the importance of those inscription devices
such as maps, figures, and tables that help to produce
the Arctic region in the first place. If the AC has or-
ganisational power it is perhaps most evident through its
capacity to act as a centre of calculation/evaluation that
can dispatch reports/declarations (immutable mobiles)
within and beyond the Arctic region that help to invoke
the current and future state of the Arctic. The Arctic
Marine Shipping Assessment (AMSA), released in 2009
under the auspices of PAME, is one of the most striking
examples to date of this capacity of the AC to act as a
geopolitical agent. The report does so in a number of dif-
ferent ways; by issuing statements by which ‘the future’
as abstract category is disclosed and related to and then
facilitate the generation of a series of scenarios relating
to future maritime use of the Arctic Ocean; by deploying
a series of practices including acts of imaging, mapping
and performing so that futures are made present; and
finally, through deploying a series of logics that involve
promoting action that aims to prevent, mitigate and/or
deter specific futures such as emergencies, disasters and
environmental catastrophe.
AMSA is not alone in this matter. As another working
group of the AC notes, ‘In all work done in the Arctic
area, it is vital that the people living there are taken
into account [rather than relying say on peer-reviewed
scientific research]. In the identification of emergency
response assets, risk assessments and response actions,
the involvement of local and indigenous people should be
increased. The increase of public awareness and of pub-
lic participation is invaluable for emergency prevention,
preparedness and response actions (EPPR 2012). This has
wider implications for how we understand the AC, and its
place in debates on the future governance of the Arctic.
Mobilising the futures
The AC, as an organisation composed of socio-material
networks, remains at the heart of continuing discussions
of Arctic futures. Its presence provides the motivation
and rationale for the AC and its selected chairs to look
to the future. As the Swedish Foreign Minister, Carl Bildt
stated, ‘Arctic countries need enhanced co-operation on
many future challenges in the Arctic, not least prevention,
preparedness, and response to oil spills. As incoming
chair we will press forward with this agenda’ (Sweden
2011). This agenda, pertaining to oil spills, is what
interests me in part about both the future of the AC
and the Arctic region itself. What might be involved in
acting to prevent, prepare and respond to future chal-
lenges including oil spills? In the midst of the 2010
Deep Horizon oil spill disaster in the Gulf of Mexico,
we have glimpsed a possible Arctic future, which was
arguably more disturbing than the 1989 Exxon Valdez
shipping accident because of the real-time imagery of
oil seeping, in a seemingly unstoppable manner, into the
marine environment (Steinberg 2010). Transposed to a
high Arctic environment, with the presence of both sea
ice and pack ice, the oil spill accident as disaster is all
the more poignant, oil trapped in and under the ice-filled
waters of the Arctic Ocean threatening microscopic and
large scale life.
The challenge facing the AC, in the context of re-
sponding to future accidents, is in part one about how
the future is made discernable. At the same time the
search and rescue agreement (SAR) was announced in
May 2011, a report was released detailing the role that
so-called black carbon, ground level ozone and methane
contributes to observed warming in the Arctic region.
In both cases, the possibility of the oil disaster and the
prospect of further warming, contribute to an uncertainty
about how to respond to the future. The very openness
of the future, some things may not happen such as
the Arctic-equivalent of Deep Horizon (but also recall
the 2010 Icelandic volcanic eruption and its disrupting
effect/affect), brings forth a sense of contingency, shock
and uncertainty leading some commentators to speculate
about the need to institutionally strengthen actors such as
the AC so that they are better able to cajole and mobilise
others either to prevent undesirable futures and/or mit-
igate (rather than prevent) against likely future disasters
including oil spills and airplane crashes (Adey and An-
derson 2011; Steinberg 2011). In any event, anticipating
let alone deterring unwelcome futures, may also mean
that the some lives/regions of the Arctic may have to be
abandoned, damaged, destroyed, degraded in the future
in order to enable other areas/lives to be protected and
saved. Climate change is already implicated in claims that
some coastal communities in Alaska such as Shishmaref
are increasingly imperiled by severe winter storms made
worse by a diminished presence of sea ice that used
to protect the coastline from direct degradation (Nutall
2012; Wassman and Lenton 2012). Other communities
in the Arctic may welcome a warmer future, if it leads
to enhanced possibilities for food production, resource
exploitation and perhaps easier living conditions in
general.
6 DODDS
The relative openness of the future underpins appeals
to preemption, preparedness and other forms of anticip-
atory action. Making the future potentially actionable
depends, inter alia, on a series of objects, practices and
affects such as the generation of insights, trends, scen-
arios, and modeling; the production and circulation of
images and reports; and the mobilisation and distribution
of anxieties, fears and hopes (for a longer reflection,
Anderson 2011, Anderson and Adey 2011). Arctic fu-
tures, as articulated through AC working group reports,
highlight how models, images and affective reactions
contribute to making-present the future and the future-
present. The uncertainty of the future, and the manner
in which it is made present, is brought to the fore by a
series of practices including calculation, imagination and
performance and once these are appreciated it is arguably
easier to tease out the underlying logics of preemption,
preparedness and the like.
The practice of calculation is critical to the estimation
of an uncertain future. AC working groups have been
at the forefront of producing reports that use impact
assessment, trend analysis and modeling to take measure
of the Arctic region. Tables, charts, maps and graphs help
not only to articulate and calculate the present but also
trace possible futures whether in the form of warming,
shipping and/or resource exploitative trends. Combined
with risk assessment and cost-benefit analysis, the net
effect of these calculative devices is to offer a series of
possible scenarios depending on particular variables such
as likely temperature rises, shipping frequency and/or
levels of resource extraction, which can then be mapped
and ranked in terms of likelihood and possible severity.
Numbers, whether expressed in centigrade, voyage num-
bers and billions of barrels of oil, have a visceral impact
and contribute to a particular neo-liberal and rationalist
strategies of rendering spaces such as the Arctic govern-
able.
The role of the imagination is also critical in making
the future present. Creative practices such as scenario
planning help to articulate and represent future events
and states of affairs by deploying images, symbols, and
stories that in turn may move and mobilize those who
read, listen and learn about them and their contents. The
AMSA was organised around four possible scenarios for
the future of marine activity and use up to 2050. With a
120 driving forces and factors identified, the report then
selected two primary factors influencing the so-called
axes of uncertainty. These were resources and trade on the
one hand and governance on the other. Armed with these
parameters, four scenarios were articulated; the ‘Polar
lows’ (low demand and unstable governance) scenario,
the ‘Arctic race’ (high demand and unstable governance)
scenario, the ‘Polar preserve’ (low demand and stable
governance) scenario and the ‘Arctic saga’ (high demand
and stable governance) scenario. The fourth scenario, for
example, is characterised as a future of high resource
demand for Arctic natural resources, significant increases
in Arctic marine traffic and a stable and developed
Arctic governance regime for multiple marine actors
and activities. According to one of the authors of the
report, ‘This Arctic world leads to a healthy rate of
Arctic development that includes broad concerns for the
preservation of Arctic cultures and ecosystems, as well
as shared economic and political interests of the Arctic
states. . .[and significantly] The AMSA scenarios proved
a powerful way to communicate to a wide audience
the complexities influencing the future of Arctic marine
navigation’ (Brigham 2011: 313). It does so, precisely,
by offering not only a narrative about possible futures
but also a sense of how each future might look and feel.
An ‘Arctic saga’ scenario is, at the very least, explicit in
recognising the importance of storytelling (richly illus-
trated throughout including multiple images of voyaging
ships), which seeks to harness the imagination.
While the openness of the future is acknowledged
throughout the AMSA, there is through the scenarios
themselves an attempt to order and categorise the Arc-
tic not least for the purpose of proposing a ‘roadmap
forward’ (Brigham 2011: 318). Indeed, such scenarios
matter in the sense of underpinning a call to arms,
within the AMSA report, with regard to developing a
mandatory polar code of navigation, an Arctic SAR, a cir-
cumpolar response capacity agreement among the Arctic
5 states in particular, and the implementation of an Arctic
Observing Network designed to share knowledge about
Arctic marine infrastructure and scientific knowledge.
The 17 recommendations of the assessment under themes
such as safety, protection and infrastructure make sense
only in the context of the invocation of uncertain futures.
The final element that underpins preemption and
preparedness is the area of performance. Activities such
as exercising, gaming and/or acting play an important
role in making the future present (for further reflection,
Anderson 2010). AC members such as Canada engage, on
an annual basis, in sovereignty and patrolling exercises.
The idea of the exercise, whether real-life or tabletop, is
to participate and learn from a future event such as oil
spill disaster or resource-related conflict. Participants are
assigned roles and the sovereignty exercise in the case of
the Canadian north is as much about testing equipment
and personnel as it is evaluating decision-making pro-
cedures when confronted with a disaster or emergency
(Dodds 2012). The future is played out, therefore, in an
embodied sense as well. Bodies are mobilised for the
duration of the performance, and affectively the future
might be felt to be some combination of stressful, excit-
ing, nerve-wracking and even boring. Either way, bodies
and objects are tested in order to evaluate capacities
and responses (Anderson 2010). Role-play and exercises
generate experiential knowledge (for example surprise
and concern over a lack of preparedness) and second
they help to galvanise action to improve and enhance
preparedness. The exercise itself then becomes a site
for experiencing how a future event, such as oil spill or
aircraft crash, might look and feel like. The 2011 SAR
amongst the eight Arctic states notes, ‘Emphasizing the
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usefulness of exchanging information and experience in
the field of search and rescue and of conducting joint
training and exercises’. Training and exercises will thus
play their part in contributing to the performance of the
future (SAR 2011).
Each of these elements, calculation, imagination and
performance, plays an important role in understanding
Arctic futures. The role of the graph, the scenario and
the experience in the form of the exercise all contribute
to bringing forward ‘the future’. The articulation and
experience of particular futures (for example dominated
by rising marine traffic, resource exploitation and/or
disaster) contributes to demands, justifications and im-
plementation of particular actions in order to secure the
ecosystems and peoples of the Arctic. This does not
guarantee action per se but it does create a context in
which, actors such as the AC can feature strongly in the
calls to prepare or prevent particular futures.
If the AC looms large in debates about Arctic futures
it does so in part through a series of logics, in which
interventions in the here and now in the name of the
future are guided, legitimated and enacted. Arctic min-
isters, such as the Swedish Foreign Minister Carl Bildt,
have drawn attention for the need of Arctic countries
to prevent, prepare and respond to uncertainties in the
Arctic. As such logics such as prevention, precaution,
preemption and preparedness invoke certain interventions
and strategies designed to adapt, avert, mitigate even
stop particular futures. Of most relevance to the AC and
debates about futures is arguably the logic of prevention
and preparedness. If prevention seeks to prevent the
occurrence of an undesirable future (for example oil
spill disaster) then preparedness addresses the aftermath
of events. It does, in short, not aim to stop the future
from happening. The emphasis here is on stopping the
impact of an event such as a disaster from disrupting the
circulations and interdependencies of the Arctic region.
The discussion surrounding the capacity and remit of
the AC is underwritten by precautionary and prepared-
ness logics. Central to this ensuing discussion has been a
willingness of the AC to speak of the Arctic in a particular
way with emphasis on vulnerability and state change.
The dependence on infrastructures (often modest and
dispersed) and interconnections between human and non-
human communities and processes (for example the role
of sea ice and permafrost in shaping animal distribution)
needs thus to be recognised explicitly. But the Arctic is
not just ‘vulnerable’, it might also as a consequence of
processes such as sea ice thinning actively resist and un-
dermine attempts to action specific future visions. While
we may be well used to reading and reflecting on the need
to build adaptability and resilience among indigenous
and northern communities, the preparedness of the AC
for an uncertain future is also an important element.
Preparedness techniques, such as issuing agreements and
calling for further action, is in part about building an
infrastructure capable of responding to potentially dis-
ruptive futures.
We might in any discussion of the future of the
AC consider how different logics such as precaution,
prevention and preparedness co-exist with one another.
How might those logics be resisted or re-negotiated? The
reaction of states such as Iceland and Finland to the
2008 Ilulissat Declaration might be one indicator of how
a preparedness logic provoked opposition and dissent,
as the five Arctic Ocean coastal states argued that they
were best placed to manage and indeed respond to future
emergencies and stewardship. As the Declaration noted:
The Arctic Ocean is a unique ecosystem, which the
five coastal states have a stewardship role in protect-
ing. Experience has shown how shipping disasters and
subsequent pollution of the marine environment may
cause irreversible disturbance of the ecological balance
and major harm to the livelihoods of local inhabitants
and indigenous communities. We will take steps in ac-
cordance with international law both nationally and in
cooperation among the five states and other interested
parties to ensure the protection and preservation of the
fragile marine environment of the Arctic Ocean. In this
regard we intend to work together including through
the International Maritime Organization to strengthen
existing measures and develop new measures to improve
the safety of maritime navigation and prevent or reduce
the risk of ship-based pollution in the Arctic Ocean
(Denmark 2008)
The recent search and rescue agreement (2011) might
be seen as a mechanism for re-integrating all eight Arctic
states into an arrangement which gives them all a stake in
shaping future challenges, in this case involving potential
disasters and emergencies. All the A8 parties have their
distinct areas of responsibility, both maritime and inshore
regions. So the invocation of future challenges, in the
context of AC development, play their part in this specific
example of institutional development, and the strengthen-
ing of co-operation.
Anticipatory activity deserves further reflection in
relation to the AC and its place within the future gov-
ernance of the Arctic. More generally, it is a key means
in which liberal democratic states in particular conduct,
secure, discipline and regulate national life. The invoc-
ation of the future assumes considerable significance
when directed towards the Arctic region, especially when
the pace and scale of physical and economic change is
emphasised. In any debate about the future of the AC, we
might attend to the following aspects; the statements that
disclose the future; the acts that make the future present;
and the logics that justify intervention in the here and
now in the name of the future. We might then in the
process observe how certain futures appear or disappear.
What futures are mobilised, and what are concealed,
marginalised and or repressed? How might experiences
of the future be modulated by the medium through which
it is made present, whether than be through narration or
an affective atmosphere (for example fear, hope)?
So when we consider the future of the AC we might
consider more explicitly what, and by what means, we
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conjure up ‘the future’. We might even seek to recover
overlooked or forgotten pasts, and possibly reflect on
future trajectories of Arctic governance. Were there mo-
ments, even in the short history of the AC and Arctic
Environment Protection Strategy (AEPS), when possible
reformist trajectories addressing possible futures, were
rejected or placed to one side? How have different vis-
ions of the future shaped the manner in which Arctic
governance (and the role of the AC) has been envisaged,
longed for and/or actively avoided?
Facing up to a future? The role of observers and the
Arctic Council
We have touched upon things that the AC, understand-
ably, wants to avoid such as air and sea disasters and
oil spills. But what about other kinds of futures that are
going to be harder to avoid such as ones involving other
parties like the European Union (EU) and the migratory
movements of fish stocks and accompanying regional
fisheries policies that will have to address EU fishing
fleets and operators?
To whit, one example we might end with is the
ongoing problematic regarding the status of observers
to the AC, and the avoidance of a particular kind of
Arctic future in which observers might occupy a more
powerful role to the detriment of permanent participants.
It is worth recalling that the rules of procedure of the AC
established the category of ‘observers’ and noted their
potential membership, role and function:
Observer status in the Arctic Council is open to: (a)
non-Arctic states; (b) inter-governmental and inter-
parliamentary organisations, global and regional; and
(c) non-governmental organizations Observers shall
be invited to the Ministerial meetings and/or to other
meetings and activities of the Arctic Council. Ob-
server status shall continue for such time, as con-
sensus exists at the Ministerial meeting. Any Ob-
server that engages in activities, which are at odds
with the Council’s Declaration, shall have its status
as an Observer suspended.
Observers may make statements at the discretion
of the Chair and submit relevant documents to the
meetings (Arctic Council 1998).
In the last few years, the role (current and future)
of observers has attracted more interest and reflection
driven in large part by anxieties over the economic
development of the Arctic Ocean. When the Arctic 5
met in Greenland in May 2008 to review and publicise
their collective approach to the management of the Arctic
Ocean, they stressed their stewardship role on the basis of
geographical proximity. The meeting and subsequent de-
claration was divisive and provocative. Some parties such
as other Arctic states and indigenous groups/permanent
participants were not invited, while others such as the
European Parliament called (initially at least) for a new
Arctic Treaty (an unwelcome future for the A8). In their
radically different ways, indigenous organisations and the
European Parliament were drawing attention to the fact
the fate of the Arctic Ocean in particular was not merely
a region to be environmentally stewarded by five coastal
states.
The rules of procedure did establish a separate ad hoc
category and enabled the membership to assess whether
they should encourage transition to full observer status,
a position held by the EU and China. In 2009, the
European Commission formally submitted an application
to become a permanent rather than ad hoc observer to
the AC. This follows on from a European Commission
document entitled ‘The European Union and the Arctic
Region’ released in November 2008, which noted that:
The European Union is inextricably linked to the
Arctic region (hereafter referred to as the Arctic) by
a unique combination of history, geography, economy
and scientific achievements. Three Member States —
Denmark (Greenland), Finland and Sweden — have
territories in the Arctic. Two other Arctic states —
Iceland and Norway — are members of the European
Economic Area. Canada, Russia and the United States
are strategic partners of the EU. European Arctic areas
are a priority in the Northern Dimension policy. Bey-
ond areas of national jurisdiction, the Arctic Ocean
contains parts pertaining to the high seas and the
seabed managed by the International Seabed Author-
ity (European Commission 2008).
The claim that the EU is ‘inextricably linked to the
Arctic region’ is the most important one, as the Arctic
is quite literally enrolled into claims that the EU is an
organisation that cannot be ‘excluded’ from Arctic mat-
ters. In other words, geographically proximate states and
indigenous peoples/northern communities alone cannot
be allowed to speak for current and future configurations
of the Arctic. While the Arctic circle, served as a geo-
graphical criterion, for membership of the AC A8) and
the Arctic Ocean with regard to coastal states (A5). the
EU’s involvement is both territorial and relational. The
EU as actor-network is deeply tied to the Arctic region,
as the seal product ban within EU markets demonstrated
in 2009. As Koivurova and others (2011: 3) note, ‘The
case shows the influence of the EU in Arctic affairs as
well as why it is important to include the EU in the
Arctic Council’ even if ‘the EU’s land presence is fairly
limited in the Arctic, contributing to the image that it
is not a major player in the region’. EU competencies
and involvement is substantial, addressing as it does a
plethora of issues and concerns such as climate change,
biological diversity, resource exploitation and conserva-
tion, shipping, fisheries and the like.
The absence of an Arctic shoreline (Greenland left the
EU in 1985) is an irrelevance, and will in no way ensure
that the EU’s role in the Arctic region will diminish.
One of the appeals for the AC of tackling issues such as
search and rescue and oil spill response is that it helps
to consolidate a territorially bounded future vision of the
Arctic. Possessing an Arctic shoreline and/or territorial
presence is prioritised not least because it contributes to
an Arctic future fundamentally shaped by the presence of
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Arctic states and permanent participants rather than ob-
servers and extra-territorial actors states and non-state
organizations alike. The decision to reject the permanent
observer status application of the EU in 2009 by the AC
was a gesture towards making a particular Arctic future
less likely. A future in which a widening range of actors
will play their part in shaping the Arctic region; the EU
in all its complexity ‘will exercise its competences in
the Arctic; if not in the Arctic Council then via other
multilateral forums. . .it is time for the established Arctic
policy actors to think seriously about how the EU could
be included in the discussion of the region’s future’
(Koivurova and others 2011, Weber and Romanyshyn
2011). And if that challenge was taken seriously then the
‘Arctic region’ itself would have to be viewed in more
relational terms rather than strictly defined by territorial
boundaries such as the Arctic Circle. All regions, includ-
ing the Arctic, are leaky and in a state of being made,
remade and unmade.
A more fixed view of the Arctic region, of course, may
make for a more attractive ‘shared future vision’. Arctic
states and permanent participants involved with the AC
conceptualise the Arctic region as a fixed container, albeit
one that is literally being cracked, melted, and trans-
formed. While indigenous groups mobilise territorial-
based strategies and representations of the Arctic to press
for an autonomous and self-determined future, others
invoke an Arctic region in which space is defined actively
in relation to objects and processes, which emphasise
connectivity and openness. This is not to claim that
the EU as complex organisation does not conceive of
the Arctic region in territorially rooted terms or that
indigenous peoples and Arctic states are incapable of
imagining the Arctic as anything but a spatial container.
As the anthropologist Claudio Aporta (2011) noted with
reference to Inuit in Canada, Arctic spaces are conceived
of as a network of trails linked to memories of previous
trips and environmental assessments of snow, ice, as well
as prevailing wind and sea conditions. Arctic space is thus
both territorially rooted and networked. Some visions of
the Arctic (and its futures) are more attractive precisely
because of what they include/exclude and open/foreclose.
Imaging futures is thus always a political as well as geo-
graphical act that configures, locates and projects actions,
behaviours and strategies; while some are highlighted
others are marginalised.
Summary
This paper is actually an appeal for those interested and
involved in the reform of the AC to consider how the
‘future’ is invoked and disclosed. A great deal of the
debate about reformation is driven, either explicitly or
implicitly, by appeals to the future. To whit, therefore,
the role of anticipation and alertness is critical, even if
interested parties might disagree over what is actually
involved in being anticipatory and/or alert let alone
prepared. While acting to secure a more hopeful future
might be better than simply wishing for a less disruptive
future, indigenous peoples disagree over, for example,
the disruptive consequences of future climate change,
for some such as the Inuit Circumpolar Council (ICC)
it might be something to be feared, while others might
welcome the opportunities that a warmer Arctic might
offer. One implication that might follow is that disclosing
the future (and of course there are likely to be more than
one) also helps to steer debate and indeed action on the
future role, structure and purpose of the AC.
Second, the manner in which the Arctic region itself
is conceptualised matters. Conceived of as a spatial con-
tainer, defined by latitude and understandings of proxim-
ity to land mass and ocean, the fixed qualities of the Arc-
tic sit uneasily with other understandings of the region as
networked and vulnerable (as well as a driver of threats)
to events and processes unfolding elsewhere. Thus any
discussion about the future of the Arctic Council as
organisation and as actor-network is in part dependent on
an explicit discussion on how to understand the Arctic
region, both territorially and relationally (Muller 2011,
Depledge 2012). Mindful of the fact that for indigenous
groups/permanent participants any enhanced role for ob-
servers in the AC such as the EU is destabilising precisely
because it offers a stark reminder of extra-territorial and
relational involvement and understanding of the Arctic
region itself.
Finally, this paper stresses that the manner in which
the future is assembled and anticipated depends on the
manner in which the Arctic (as a place) is taken as a given
or indeed self-evident. As recent events suggest (such as
2008 Illulisat Declaration and the subsequent Arctic 5
meeting in Canada in March 2010), there are tensions
between the coastal and non-coastal parties to the AC,
and that includes future visions for the Arctic region. But
there are also other tensions as well. While indigenous
peoples (as represented by the permanent participants of
the AC) reacted negatively to these A5 meetings, there
are also tensions between indigenous peoples and non-
indigenous northerners in terms of how and where their
‘interests’ and ‘wishes’ are represented and acted upon.
So disclosing, let alone acting on, the future depends on
the constituency involved and accompanying knowledge
base, which is in the Arctic context, remains uneven in
access, distribution and extent.
When the future is invoked, therefore, we need to
investigate carefully how people and institutions use
stores of circumpolar knowledge (whether exemplified
in reports, declarations and the like) to inform, test and
reveal the future possibilities of the AC. Moreover, these
debates and interventions are part of the here and now.
As anthropologists and geographers recognise, action is
taken in the present in the hope of realising a future
course of events, and that interest is in how the future
is made to figure in the lives of people and the mission
statements/directions of institutions, including (but not
exclusively) the AC (Nuttall 2012; Wassman and Lenton
2012). In so doing, a focus on anticipation brings to the
fore the role that action, agency, imagination, possibility,
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doubt, uncertainty, fear and apprehension all play in
making sense of rapid change whether it involves sea ice
thinning and/or environmental degradation. What actor-
network approaches help remind us is that the futures that
emerge from particular institutions such as the AC are not
necessarily reducible to the internal workings and logics
of the institution itself, if certain futures gain traction then
the interaction of agencies beyond the AC also matter.
Acknowledgements
The referees are thanked for their kind comments on an
earlier version of the paper, and I am very appreciative
of Mark Nuttall for his intellectual companionship. The
British Academy generously funded this research. A diff-
erent version was presented at Toronto in January 2012
under the auspices of the Munk School of Global Affairs
and the Walter and Duncan Gordon Foundation. Timo
Koivurova and Waliul Hasanat provided vital organisa-
tional and academic support for this event. I also thank
my Royal Holloway, University of London colleagues
Peter Adey and Duncan Depledge for our conversations
along the way. The usual disclaimers apply, however.
References
ACIA. (Arctic Climate Impact Assessment). 2005. Impact of a
warming Arctic: Arctic climate change impact assessment
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Adey, P. and B. Anderson 2011. Anticipation, materialtiy event:
The Icelandic ashcloud disruption and the security of mobility.
Mobilities 6: 11–20.
Agnew, J. 2007. Know–where: geographies of knowledge of
world politics. International Political Sociology 1: 138–148.
Anderson, A. 2009. After the ice: life, death, and geopolitics in
the new Arctic. New York: Smithsonian Books.
Anderson, B. 2010. Preemption, precaution and preparedness:
anticipatory action and future geographies. Progress in
Human Geography 34: 777–798.
Anderson, B. 2012. Affect and biopower: towards a politics of life.
Transactions of the Institute of British Geographers 37: 28–
43.
Anderson, B. and P. Adey. 2011. Affect and security: Exercising
emergency in UK civil contigencies. Environment and Plan-
ning D: Society and Space 29: 1092–1109.
Aporta, C. 2011. Shifting perspectives on shifting ice: document-
ing and representing Inuit use of the sea ice.The Canadian
Geographer 55: 6–19.
Arctic Governance. 2010. Arctic governance in an era of
transformative change: critical questions, governance
principles. Arctic Governance Project (Ways forward report
of the Arctic governance project, 14 April 2010. URL:
http://www.arcticgovernance.org/agp–report–and–action–
agenda.156784.en.html (accessed 13 November 2011).
ASMA. (Arctic Marine Shipping Assessment). 2009. Report.
Protection of the Arctic marine environment. Akureyri: AMSA.
Byers, M. 2009. Who owns the Arctic? Vancouver: Douglas and
McIntyre.
Crate, S., and M. Nuttall (editors). 2009. Anthropology and
climate: from encounters to action. Walnut Creek CA: Left
Coast Press.
Depledge, D. 2012. Arctic assembly: the polar policies of the UK.
London: University of London, Royal Holloway, Department
of Geography, unpublished paper.
Dodds, K. 2011. Accessibility, resources and sovereignty in the
Arctic Ocean. Global Policy 1: 303– 311.
Dodds, K. 2012. Graduated and paternal sovereignty: Stephen
Harper, Arctic sovereignty and Operation Nanook 10 Envir-
onment and Planning D: Society and Space 30: in press.
EPPR. (Emergency, Prevention, Preparedness and Response).
2011. Emergency, prevention, preparedness and response
Tromso: EPPR Working Group of the Arctic Council.
URL: http://eppr.arctic–council.org/content/background.htm
(accessed 13 November 2011).
Heininen, L., and C. Southcott (editors). 2010. Globalization and
the circumpolar north Fairbanks: University of Alaska Press.
Koivurova, T. 2011a. Limits and possibilities of the Arctic Council
in a rapidly changing scene of Arctic governance. Polar
Record 47: 146–156.
Koivurova, T. 2011b. The actions of the Arctic states respecting
the continental shelf: a reflective essay. Ocean Development
and International Law 42: 211–226.
Koivurova, T., K Kokko, S. Duyck, N. Selheim, and A.
Stepien. 2011. The present and future competence
of the European Union in the Arctic. Polar Record
doi:10.1017/S0032247411000295
Massey, D. 1995. Places and their past. History Workshop
Journal 39: 182–192.
Moisi, D 2009 The geopolitics of emotion London: Bodley Head.
Muller, M. 2011. Opening the black box of the organization
for critical geopolitics. St-Gallen, Switzerland: University of
St-Gallen Switzerland (Working paper August 2011 URL:
www.martin–muller.net).
Neumann, I. 2012. At home with diplomats. Cornell: Cornell
University Press.
Nuttall, M. 2008. Anticipation, climate change, and movement in
Greenland. Etudes/Inuit Studies 34: 21–37.
Nuttall, M. 2012. Tipping points and the human world: living with
change and thinking about the future. Ambio: A Journal of the
Human Environment 41: 96–105.
Nuuk Declaration. 2011. Nuuk declaration on the occa-
sion of the seventh ministerial meeting of the Arctic
Council, 12 May 2011. Nuuk, Greenland.: Arctic Coun-
cil. URL: http://www.arctic–council.org/index.php/en/about/
documents/category/5–declaration(accessed 13 November
2011).
Ottawa Declaration, 1996. Declaration on the establishment of
an Arctic Council, 19 September 1996, Ottawa, Canada.
URL: http://arctic–council.org/filearchive/ottawa_decl_1996–
3..pdf (accessed 13 November 2011).
SAO. (Senior Arctic Officials). 2011. SAO report to minis-
ters, Nuuk, Greenland: Arctic Council. URL: http://arctic–
council.org/filearchive/nuuk_SAO_report.pdf (accessed 13
November 2011).
Search and Rescue Agreement. 2010. Agreement on the
co–operation on aeronautical and maritime search
and rescue in the Arctic. URL: http://arctic–council.org/
filearchive/Arctic_SAR_Agreement_EN_FINAL_for_signature
_21–Apr–2011.pdf (accessed 13 November 2011).
Smith, L. 2010. The world in 2050: four forces shaping civiliza-
tion’s northern future. New York: Dutton.
Steinberg, P. 2010. The deepwater horizon, the Mavi Marmara,
and the dynamic zonation of ocean space.The Geographical
Journal 177: 12–16.
Stephenson, S., L. Smith, J. Agnew. 2011. Divergent long term
trajectories of human access to the Arctic. Nature Climate
Change 1: 156–160.
SWIPA (Snow, Water, Ice, Permafrost in the Arctic) 2011. Snow,
water, ice, permafrost in the Arctic. Oslo: AMAP. URL:
http://amap.no/swipa/ (accessed 2 February 2012).
ANTICIPATING THE ARCTIC AND THE ARCTIC COUNCIL 11
Tromsø Declaration. 2009. Tromsø declaration on the oc-
casion of the sixth ministerial meeting of the Arctic
Council, 29 April 2009. Tromsø, Norway.: Arctic Coun-
cil. URL: http://www.arctic–council.org/index.php/en/about/
documents/category/5–declarations (accessed 13 November
2011).
Wallman, W. (editor). 2002. Contemporary futures: perspectives
from social anthropology. London: Routledge.
Wang, M., and J. Overland. 2009. A sea ice free summer
Arctic within 30 years? Geophysical Research Letters 36
L07502doi:10.1029/2009GL037820.
Wassman, P., and T. Lenton. 2012. Arctic tipping points in an
earth system perspective. Ambio: A Journal of the Human
Environment 41: 1–9.
Weber, S., and L. Romanyshyn. 2011. Breaking the ice:
the European Union and the Arctic. International Journal
Autumn: 849–860.
Young, O. 2011. If an Arctic Ocean treaty is not the solution, what
is the alternative?’Polar Record 47: 327–334.
Young, O. 2012. Arctic tipping–points: governance in turbulent
times. Ambio: A Journal of the Human Environment 41: 75–
84.
